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Abstract: This study analyses the effects of political institutions and macroeconomic factors on credit risk in 
South Africa using quarterly data between 1998 and 2016. The study uses the ARDL approach to 
cointegration and reports on both long-run and short-run influences of credit risk. In the long-run political 
institutions and gold prices are found to positively impact credit risk whereas Gross domestic product has a 
negative influence on credit risk. In the short-run however political institutions have a negative influence on 
credit risk. Further, the study confirms the recent country risk downgrades by rating agencies, S & P, Moody 
and Fitch. Policies that grow the economy and are consistent with the government’s long-term strategy needs 
to be followed to improve investor and lender confidence. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Credit risk has become an important issue in today’s economies as it determines the flow of funds to meet 
production needs. With a huge reliance on bank credit, South African firms could find it difficult to compete at 
the global or regional level if the cost of debt spirals. On the other hand, the government of South Africa has 
been reeling under a huge stock of debt, increasingly growing as the country continues to face unprecedented 
trade deficits (Ayadi and Ayadi, 2008). The credit risk downgrades experienced recently1 need to be analyzed 
in the context of the long-term relationship between political institutions and credit risk in the country. We 
ask the question whether political institutions matter for credit risk management in South Africa over both 
the short and long term. By so doing we contribute to the already established literature on the determinants 
of credit risk and proffer some policy options for the South African government. In debt markets, credit rating 
agencies play an important role by reducing search costs, lowering the incidence of moral hazard (Chang et 
al., 2017). During the past two decades rating agencies have become more popular, seemingly pointing out 
the bad apples from investment grade debt instruments. The South African government has not been spared 
by these referees, with several downgrades being assigned to the debt-burdened country as a result of several 
inconsistent decisions by the South African government. However, the long-term effects of such institutional 
factors on credit risk have not been documented. In this study we sought to establish to what extent these 
institutional factors are important in determining credit risk. Our results also seek to refute or validate recent 
public outcries over rating downgrades by credit rating agencies, Fitch, S&P and Moody’s. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Credit risk is a measure of the probability of default on the principal and interest components of a debt 
instrument (Garr, 2013). This can arise due to the decline in the creditworthiness of the borrower or the 
inability on their part to fulfil their contractual obligations (Manab et al., 2015). Lenders are concerned with 
the level of credit risk because it determines the extent to which they will be able to receive returns on their 
investment. According to Manab et al. (2015) high credit risk ratings reduces investor confidence and can 
lead to divestment. Whilst a huge pool of literature exists on the relationship between credit risk and its 
associated bank-specific and macroeconomic determinants, the impact of institutional variables on financial 
stability cannot be dismissed (Ashraf, 2017, Roe and Siegel, 2011). Theoretically our study is founded on 
theories of bank risk-taking behavior and the theory of political institutions. Ashraf (2017) provides a 
theoretical link between bank risk-taking and political institutions in which political stability encourages high 
risk-taking by banks, and hence increases financial instability. According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) 
institutions can be divided into political and economic institutions. Whilst the former is equally important for 
the attainment of increased welfare, the latter is argued to be directly related to economic activity. Economic 
                                                 
1 South Africa experienced several credit rating downgrades during the period 2012 to 2017, during the Presidency 
of Jacob Zuma. 
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institutions such as financial regulation, other laws and investor protection rules are essential in promoting 
financial market activity (Qi et al., 2010, Roe and Siegel, 2011).  
 
Roe and Siegel (2011) argue that political institutions impact the financial sector through their effect on 
economic institutions. In another study, Liu and Zhong (2017) find that political uncertainty impact more on 
credit risk of firms where investor protection is low. This view suggests that it is difficult to maintain sound 
economic institutions in the absence of a robust political system. The present study tests both theories and 
provides evidence of the effect of political institutions on credit risk in both the short-run and long-run. Other 
stylized determinants of credit risk have been divided into macroeconomic, industry and firm-specific 
determinants (Manab et al., 2015, Podpiera and Ötker, 2010, Virolainen, 2003). Knoop (2008) argues that 
interest in the analysis of credit risk stems from the importance attached to the financial sector in achieving 
economic stability. It is therefore not surprising that recent studies have concentrated on the relationship 
between financial variables and the real economy. Due to data constraints however, fewer studies have been 
carried out in the sub-Saharan region (Garr, 2013, Nikolaidou and Vogiazas, 2017). The bulk of the studies 
have concentrated on advanced economies, which generally have large financial sectors (Chaibi and Ftiti, 
2015) and Asian emerging market economies (Waemustafa and Sukri, 2015).  
 
Studies in South Africa includes Havrylchyk (2010). Clark and Kassimatis (2015) and Nikolaidou and 
Vogiazas (2017) also include South Africa in different panel studies. Havrylchyk (2010) identifies 
macroeconomic influences on credit risk in South Africa and stress tests the South African banking sector 
using scenario analysis. In Nikolaidou and Vogiazas (2017) macroeconomic determinants of credit risk are 
analyzed for five sub-Saharan countries including South Africa. Both studies do not consider the effect of 
political institutions on credit risk, which is one of the objectives of this paper. Clark and Kassimatis (2015) 
add a political risk variable in a panel of 22 countries to account for credit risk. It is however not feasible to 
derive any country-specific policy conclusions from panel studies. Castro (2013) segments the determinants 
of credit risk into systematic and unsystematic factors. Unsystematic or idiosyncratic risk factors are factors 
relating to individual firms, such as firm management, financial position, financing sources and production 
processes. Idiosyncratic factors can however be controlled by the firm, although it will depend on the firm’s 
risk management skills.  
 
Thus at the macro level, it is systematic risk that researchers are concerned with. Systematic risk factors are 
those macroeconomic and industry-wide factors that may cause a business to default on its obligations 
(Manab et al., 2015). According to Cosset and Roy (1991) such studies can be used to validate credit rating 
agencies’ sovereign credit ratings. Systematic variables that have been used to explain credit risk include the 
gross domestic product (GDP) as a measure of overall economic activity or the size of the economy. Castro 
(2013) argues that the worsening of economic activity should increase credit risk as consumers are faced 
with a constraining environment that inhibits their debt servicing capacity. In their study GDP has a negative 
influence on non-performing loans. Other variables that have been used are the real effective exchange rate, 
the inflation rate, credit to private sector, the interest rate and government borrowing (Castro, 2013, Garr, 
2013, Louzis et al., 2012, Manab et al., 2015, Liu and Zhong, 2017). We add a variable that accounts for 
political risk in the form of a Government Integrity (GI)2 index from Heritage’s Economic freedom index. 
 
Empirical Literature: The first step in analysing credit risk is finding an accurate measure of credit risk 
itself. Different measures have been suggested in the literature, including non-performing loans, loan loss 
provisions and sovereign credit spreads (Garr, 2013, Podpiera and Ötker, 2010). Podpiera and Ötker (2010) 
describe three ratios that measure the quality of bank assets, the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans, 
the ratio of Non-performing loans to Total loans and the ratio of loan loss provisions to Non-performing 
loans. Loan loss provisions measure credit risk in the short term whilst non-performing loans could measure 
risk in the long term. They argue that both measures should be positively related to credit risk. The present 
study uses both loan loss provisions and Non-performing loans as measures of credit risk to measure the risk 
of default in debt extended by South African banks. Several studies have undertaken to empirically analyse 
                                                 
2 Government Integrity Index derives from Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. It is based on 
a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 represents high corruption and 10 represents little corruption. The measure is converted to 
percentage by multiplying it by a scale of 10. 
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the underlying sources of credit risk (Garr, 2013, Jiménez and Saurina, 2004, Waemustafa and Sukri, 2015, 
Castro, 2013). However constraints in the form of lack of reliable data have limited such studies in developing 
countries, especially Africa (Nikolaidou and Vogiazas, 2017). Available studies show that a number of factors 
affect credit. These can be grouped into bank level characteristics, industry level factors and macroeconomic 
factors.  
 
The study by Manab et al. (2015) uses four bank ratios as independent variables in a logistic regression to 
determine the sources of bankruptcy among Malaysian banks. The study shows that the profitability ratio 
was positively related to distress. Working capital ratio is negatively related to bankruptcy. Their study 
points to better credit risk management at the bank level. Their findings are supported by Garr (2013) who 
finds a positive association between credit risk and management efficiency. Garr (2013) carried out a study 
on Ghana using aggregated data from 33 banks. The study employs Ordinary Least Squares regression and 
finds that credit risk is positively related to GDP per capita and management inefficiency. Government 
borrowing and financial sector development negatively influence credit risk. The relationship between GDP 
and credit risk is supported by Castro (2013) who investigated macroeconomic determinants of credit risk in 
five European countries. Castro (2013) employs panel data techniques, ranging from the pooled OLS 
estimator, fixed effects model, random effects model and the Arrelano and Bond GMM estimator. In another 
study Nikolaidou and Vogiazas (2017) use the ARDL approach to cointegration to establish the relationship 
between credit risk and its determinants in African countries. Their study uses different explanatory 
variables for five Sub-Saharan African countries to explain credit risk in Africa. Of interest is the inclusion of 
South Africa in this study. However, whilst macroeconomic factors are found to be of statistical significance, 
no reference is made to institutional factors, which underlie most macroeconomic dynamics. Money supply, 
gold prices and the Treasury bill rate are all found to be statistically significant. 
 
3. Econometric Modeling and Data 
 
The study uses quarterly data from the SARB and an institutional index from Heritage that measures 
government integrity for the period 1998 Q1 to 2016 Q4. Whilst 1994 would be the year of choice to start at 
as the new regime took over, the sample choice is constrained by lack of data on government integrity for 
periods beyond 1998. Political stability is essential to guarantee short-term financial stability and we 
therefore recommend policies aimed at rooting out corruption and malfunctioning of public enterprises. The 
baseline model follows earlier studies by Waemustafa and Sukri (2015) and Havrylchyk (2010), and is 
specified below: 
 
 𝑁𝑃𝐿 = 𝑓(𝑔𝑑𝑝, 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝑔𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠, 𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟, 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)  (1) 
 
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_2𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑡 + 𝜇  (2) 
 
Data on political institutions is taken from Heritage. Whilst data on several variables used is found in shorter 
frequency, the data on political institutions is available on a yearly basis. We transform the data to quarterly 
frequency3. All data that is not in percentages is transformed into logarithms. This has at least two 
advantages; firstly, coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. A second advantage is to avoid 
heteroscedasticity. Whilst growth has been sluggish in South Africa, diversification of industries and boosting 
the informal economy could result in higher output. Secondly we suggest that sound political institutions be 
accompanied by relevant regulation of financial markets for long-term financial stability.  
 
Estimation Technique: Several techniques for estimating time series data are used in literature ranging 
from the single equation to techniques that can simulate a system of equations. Although most single 
equation techniques provide information on the relationship between a theoretically determined dependent 
variable and its determinants, they are limited however in cases where some variables are endogenous and 
where dynamic effects are important. Due to such considerations and the fact that data on NPLs is not 
available for a longer period of time, the study employs the ARDL technique of Pesaran and Shin (1998) as the 
                                                 
3 A quadratic based interpolation is used in E views to transform the data. Alternative data generating processes do 
not suggest significant changes to our results. 
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base modelling approach. Nkoro and Uko (2016) argue that the ARDL approach is preferred to the Vector 
autoregression (VAR) where a single cointegration vector exists and does not require that all variables be 
integrated of the same order. The ARDL approach can be applied when series are either I(0) or I(1) or a 
combination of both (DAVIDESCU, 2015, Nikolaidou and Vogiazas, 2017). In addition Nikolaidou and Vogiazas 
(2017) argue the ARDL approach is robust to small samples. Single equation estimation in the form of the 
Fully Modified OLS will be estimated to check whether the results are robust to a change in the estimation 
technique. The ARDL model for the present study can be expressed as follows: 
∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼1𝑖∆
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼2𝑖∆
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼3𝑖∆
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼4𝑖∆
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝐿𝐺𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑡−1 +
∑ 𝛼5𝑖∆
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝐺𝐼𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼6𝑖∆
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_2𝑡−1 + 𝛼7𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡−1 + 𝛼8𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛼9𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛼10𝐿𝐺𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛼11𝐺𝐼𝑡−1 +
𝛼12𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_2𝑡−1 + 𝛼13𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡 +∈𝑡      (3) 
 
Where 𝛼1 − 𝛼6 are the short-run coefficients and 𝛼7 − 𝛼13 NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans and advances of banks. The data is collected from the South African Reserve Bank4. REER represents the 
real effective exchange rate and LGDP is the log of GDP at market prices. Government integrity (GI) is a 
measure of political institutions, taken from Heritage.org. The data for GI originates from Transparency 
International corruption index, which ranges from 0 to 10. We multiply each score buy 10 to convert it into a 
percentage. SIZE_2 is the ratio of loans to total assets expressed as a percentage. LGOLD is the logarithm of 
gold prices. Since South Africa is a major exporter of gold, we expect that an increase in gold prices should 
reduce credit risk. CRISIS is a dummy that accounts for the 2007/2008 GFC. 
 
Unit Roots Tests: The data is tested for unit roots using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the 
Philips Perron test (PP). Testing for unit roots has become a standard practice in the analysis of time series 
data as it allows the researcher to establish the order of integration of a series. However, the aim of unit root 
tests in the ARDL model is not to determine if the variables are integrated of the same order but to ensure 
that no variables are integrated of order 2 (I2) and above. As a result of the longer period under analysis, the 
data may contain structural breaks, especially to reflect the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Under such 
conditions, the ADF and PP tests do not have the power to reject the null hypothesis of no unit root. A 
structural break unit test is used as a robustness check.  
 
Lag Length Selection Criteria: Brooks (2014), identifies two ways of selecting the optimal lag length. Firstly, 
the use of data frequency is a widely acknowledged method of selecting a lag length. The approach assigns a 
lag length of 1 for annual data, a lag length of 4 for quarterly data, and a lag length of 12 for monthly data. The 
second approach is the VAR lag length selection criterion, which utilizes various criterions to establish the lag 
length. The criterion used in the VAR approach include the Final prediction error (FPE), Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC), the Hannan Quin (HQ), the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and the LR ratio. The study uses 
the VAR, which is run in differences to determine the lag length. Using the LR ratio, the number of lags chosen 
is four. However, when estimating the equation in E views, we find it appropriate to use a maximum of 3 lags 
and allow for automatic selection of lags for each variable.  
 
Bounds Test to Cointegration: Before one can estimate the short-run and long-run coefficients of the model, 
the ARDL approach requires that one estimate the equation in levels and use of the Pesaran et al. (2001) 
Bounds test approach to test for cointegration. Nkoro and Uko (2016) show that the Bounds test for 
cointegration uses a Wald-type, F-test to test the joint significance of coefficients in the above-specified 
model, separately for the long-run and short-run sections. If the F-statistic obtained is greater than the upper 
bound of the critical values, cointegration between the variables exists. When the F-statistic falls inside the 
band, then cointegration cannot be determined. Thirdly, if the F-statistic falls below the lower bound, there is 
no cointegration (Pesaran et al., 2001). 
 
Long-Run and Short-Run Effects: Having established the existence of a cointegrated relationship, the next 
step is to estimate the Error Correction model. Of importance however is the sign of the Error correction term 
(ECT). When the ECT has a negative sign, with an absolute value less than one, then it can be concluded that 
the deviation from equilibrium is being corrected (i.e. convergence takes place). On the other hand, if the ECT 
is positive, there is divergence. The disequilibrium is not corrected. An ECT that is negative but greater than 
one in absolute terms may indicate that the model is over correcting. 
                                                 
4Annual Reports of the Bank Supervision Department of the SARB 
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4. Empirical Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Unit Root Testing: Descriptive statistics are provided in Table A1 in the 
appendix. Agung (2011), notes that policy analysis and decision making can be enhanced by paying attention 
to the uni-variate characteristics of the data. These low-interest rates could result in increased credit and if 
coupled with lax credit requirements, lead to high non-performing loans. Measures of central tendency such 
as mean, median and mode are calculated and displayed in a table for each variable. Table 1 below 
summarizes results of the unit root tests performed on each variable. Three unit-root tests are undertaken; 
augmented Dicky-Fuller test, Philips Peron test and Breakpoint unit root test. Detailed results are shown in 
table A3 in the appendix. No trend specification is made and all but one of the variables I (1). The remaining 
variable (REER) is I (0). 
 
Table 1: Unit Root Tests 
Variable ADF statistic  PP Statistic  Break Test  
statistic 
Overall Decision 
NPL_1 -1.088453  -0.734371  -2.968600 Non-stationary 
GI -0.585186  -1.539981  -2.514177 Non-stationary 
LGOLD 2.468720  3.466406  -3.245280 Non-stationary 
SIZE_2 -0.130597  -0.154437  -1.668569 Non-stationary 
REER -8.042978***  -8.031491***  -8.609581*** Stationary 
LGDP 16.91130  14.24842  -3.557097 Non-stationary 
∆𝑁𝑃𝐿_1 -2.616399***  -4.007213***  -2.214896** Stationary 
∆𝐺𝐼 -4.222026***  -4.831735***  -5.141911*** Stationary 
∆𝐿𝐺𝑂𝐿𝐷 -6.215590***  -6.209132***  -7.612380*** Stationary 
∆𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_2 -7.922491***  -8.043682***  -8.761511*** Stationary 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃 -1.162702  -2.248192**  -80782132*** Stationary 
***, **, * indicates stationary at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively ∆ indicates the first difference  
 
Model Selection and Lag Length Selection: The final model selected using the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) is (3, 1, 1, 2, 0, 1) as shown in Figure 1 below. The highest lag for both the dependent and independent 
variables is set at 3 and we use the automatic lag selection option. Initially we follow the traditional VAR lag 
length selection criterion by running a VAR in differences for all save for one of the variables that is I (0). We 
choose 4 lags as selected by the LR ratio. During estimation however, we adjust the lags to get rid of serial 
correlation problem. The criterion for model selection is that we select the model with the lowest AIC value.  
 
Figure 1: Model Selection 
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Model Diagnostics and Stability Tests: Two of our coefficients signs require special mention because they 
differ from theoretical expectations. Firstly, gold prices show a positive and significant relationship with non-
performing loans. In the long run a 1% increase in gold prices results in a 1.93% increase in non-performing 
loans. The result differs from Nikolaidou and Vogiazas (2017) and Havrylchyk (2010). The same result is 
found in Dimitrios et al. (2016) and Castro (2013). This could be indicating the increase in credit taken by 
gold producers in order to sustain large trade volumes as prices are increasing (Gillespie et al., 2010). The 
selected model meets the criterion as determined by a test for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. As 
shown in table A3 in the appendix both the F-statistic and the observed R-squared test statistics are not 
statistically significant, implying that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Table A4 
shows the results from the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroscedasticity. We employ the Ramsey RESET 
test in table A5 to test whether the model is correctly specified and the results show that the model is 
correctly specified. Further we also use the CUSUM test as shown in Figure A1 to test model coefficients 
stability. The model selected is also dynamically stable as shown by the AR roots graph below. 
 
Figure 2: Model Dynamic Stability 
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Bound Test Results: Cointegration results are shown in Table 2 below as shown in the table, the F-statistic of 
3.63 is greater than the upper bound at 5% level of significance. Therefore, we can conclude that the variables 
in the model are cointegrated and a long-run relationship exists. The result resonates with existing evidence 
from studies such as Nikolaidou and Vogiazas (2017). This finding necessitates the use of the ARDL technique 
to estimate both short-run and long-run coefficients.  
 
Table 2: Bounds Test for Cointegration 
 F-statistic Critical bounds at 5% 
Lower bound I(0) Upper bound I(1) 
Model 1  3.63 2.14 3.34 
 
Estimation Results and Discussion  
 
Long-Run: Long-run estimates are shown in Table 3 below. As expected GDP and credit risk have a negative 
and significant relationship at the 1% level of significance. Specifically, a 1% increase in GDP results in a -
1.88% decrease in non-performing loans. This is not surprising as an increase in economic activity should 
increase households and firm income, which in turn improves their capacity to repay loans. The coefficient of 
the size of the banking system as measured by total bank assets is positive at 0.24 and significant at 10% 
level. Non-performing loans are increasing as banks expand their operations. The REER does not significantly 
influence credit risk in the long-run. The dummy representing the 2007/8 crisis shows a positive and 
significant relationship between credit risk and the crisis. This is expected as the crisis had a negative impact 
on economic activity and employment leading to reduced income levels. The resultant recession decreased 
the capacity of borrowers to service their debt and increased the balance of overdue loans on the bank’s 
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balance sheets. Thus as commodity buyers increase purchases, credit purchases also increase and defaulters 
increase, cutting on cash receipts of gold producers who turn to bank credit to sustain supply.  
 
In turn commodity producers also default on their bank obligations, increasing NPLs in the process. 
Government integrity (GI) is negatively related to credit risk in the short run as expected from theory. These 
short-run results justify credit rating downgrades assigned to South Africa in recent years due to 
inconsistency in policy characterized by a change of government ministers and corruption allegations against 
senior government officials. Increased corruption erodes consumer and business confidence in the economy 
resulting in low economic activity and reduced ability to repay debt. On the contrary, it is however showing a 
positive and significant relationship with credit risk in the long-run. This implies political stability could be 
contributing to lax borrowing requirements by lenders, creating periods of stability in which credit extension 
is negligently done. Another reason stems from the literature on bank risk-taking behavior. As shown in 
Ashraf (2017) political stability encourage high risk-taking by banks, especially where competition from non-
bank financial institutions is rife in loan offerings. Qi et al. (2010) demonstrate that political institutions have 
an important effect on the interest rate, with increased political rights resulting in low-interest rates.    
 
Table 3: Long Run Coefficients 
Sample: 1998Q1 2016Q4 Dependent variable: NPL_1      
Variable   Coefficient   t-statistic   P-value 
REER   0.018806  0.3043 0.7668 
LGDP   -1.876089***  -3.1632 0.0025 
LGOLD   1.931302***  2.7564 0.0078 
GI   0.248310***  3.4605 0.0010 
SIZE_2   0.126198*  1.7875 0.0790 
CRISIS   4.283761**   2.5526 0.0133 
***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively 
 
Short-Run Results: In the short-run as evident from table 5, the error correction term is negative and highly 
significant at 1% level. The short-run dynamics are therefore reinforcing the model towards equilibrium in 
the long-run. The ECT of -0.11 implies that about 11% of the deviation from equilibrium in the previous 
quarter is corrected in the current quarter. The speed of adjustment is fair considering that the data is of 
quarterly frequency, which is relatively high. The coefficients of GDP, GI, SIZE_2 and CRISIS are all highly 
significant and take the expected signs. GDP is negatively related to non-performing loans. Government 
integrity is negatively related to non-performing loans, which may confirm the negative influence on financial 
stability witnessed in recent years. This finding resonates with the decision by rate agencies to downgrade 
South African bonds in recent years and confirms results by other studies (Havrylchyk, 2010). As captured by 
the size of banking assets, industry factors play a more pronounced role in determining credit risk in the 
short-run. SIZE_2 is highly significant at 1% level in the short-run with a positive coefficient of 0.10. Again we 
do find a paradox as gold prices reflect a positive and highly significant influence on non-performing loans in 
the short-run. We report that a 1% increase in gold prices results in a 1.3% increase in non-performing loans 
(worsening of credit risk). 
 
Table 4: Cointegrating Form 
Sample: 1998Q1 2016Q4 Dependent Variable: NPL_1     
Variable  Coefficient   t-statistic  P-value 
D (NPL_1 (-1))  0.320704***   3.01308 0.0038 
D (NPL_1 (-2))  0.260869**   2.40275 0.0195 
D (REER)  0.002044  0.3085 0.7588 
D (LGDP)  -4.649577**  -2.2746 0.0266 
D (LGOLD)  1.285868***  2.8398 0.0062 
D (GI)   -0.065215**  -2.1634 0.0346 
D (SIZE_2)  0.103445***  2.9765 0.0042 
D (SIZE_2 (-1))  0.052304  1.4970 0.1398 
D (CRISIS)  0.465499***  3.4805 0.0010 
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CointEq (-1)  -0.108666***   -3.9219   0.0002 
Cointeq = NPL_1 - (0.0188*REER-1.8761*LGDP + 1.9313*LGOLD +0.2483*GI + 0.1262*SIZE_2 + 
4.2838*CRISIS) 
***** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
The study investigates the macroeconomic and institutional determinants of credit risk. We use the gross 
domestic product, gold prices, the real effective exchange rate, government integrity and the size of the 
banking sector as determinants of credit risk in South Africa. Our measure of credit risk is non-performing 
loans. The gross domestic product has a negative influence on credit risk both in the short-run and in the 
long-run. The results are in line with findings from similar studies by Dimitrios et al. (2016) and Castro 
(2013). These results have strong implications for the role of increased economic activity in driving down the 
number of non-performing loans. However, these findings are unique in that they provide representations for 
both the short-run and long-run periods. We find that government integrity is negatively related to credit risk 
in the short-run but positively related to credit risk in the long-run. The short-run results resonate with a 
theory on political risk and credit (Liu and Zhong, 2017). Thus as argued in Knoop (2008), our results show 
that credit markets are important in driving the business cycle. Increased credit risk induces investors to 
withdraw funding or seek safe investments elsewhere.  
 
Contrary to the preceding, we do not find evidence that government integrity is important in improving credit 
risk in the long-run. Instead, an improvement in government integrity seems to be exacerbating credit risk in 
the long-run. This finding is in line with theories of bank risk-taking behaviour and implies South African 
banks face stiffer competition in credit markets during periods of political stability, hence engage in high-risk 
lending to beat completion (Ashraf, 2017). Our results also find a positive relationship between non-
performing loans and gold prices in both the short and long-run, which is contrary to the findings of 
Nikolaidou and Vogiazas (2017). Other studies linking gold prices to the financial sector do not find a 
statistically significant relationship between the two (Ziaei, 2012). The ratio of loans to total banking assets is 
positively related to credit risk in both the short-run and the long-run. The positive sign on SIZE_2 shows that 
growth in bank assets increases the vulnerability of the banking industry. The result support evidence by 
Nikolaidou and Vogiazas (2017) who uses the loan to asset ratio to determine the effect of the growth in loans 
on credit risk. In the spirit of this paper, we recommend policies that are aimed at increasing economic 
growth.  
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Appendix  
 
Table A1: Correlation Analysis 
  NPL_1 LGOLD LGDP REER GI CRISIS SIZE_2 
NPL_1 1,0000       
LGOLD 0.2293295 1,0000      
LGDP 0.1128877 0.9797495 1,0000     
REER 0.0549836 -0.006428 0.0394582 1,0000    
GI 0.3104460 -0.690214 -0.764350 0.03302881 1,0000   
CRISIS 0.1496169 0.1104588 0.0981323 0.12248471 0.0879167 1,0000 
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SIZE_2 0.2975786 -0.184045 -0.279218 -0.0816926 0.2157096  -0.239511 1,0000 
*GDP and Gold prices appear highly correlated – could lead to the problem of multi-collinearity. But as argued 
in Madala and Lahiri (2009) highly cross correlation alone is not enough to conclude the presents of multi-
collinearity.  
 
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics 
  NPL_1 LGOLD LGDP LSIZE REER GI CRISIS 
 Mean  3.450921  8.581133  14.48843  14.49658 -0.140789  47.18947  0.052632 
 Median  3.390000  8.470188  14.54233  14.65904  0.700000  47.18750  0.000000 
 Maximum  5.940000  9.846258  15.29965  15.39907  13.50000  61.59375  1.000000 
 Minimum  1.100000  7.283874  13.53097  13.23998 -15.20000  40.50625  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  1.366326  0.817003  0.545825  0.661665  5.212400  4.042852  0.224781 
 Skewness  0.041803  0.020947 -0.191459 -0.368113 -0.417570  0.689012  4.006938 
 Kurtosis  2.252180  1.505907  1.737264  1.765762  3.822847  4.110110  17.05556 
                
Jarque-Bera  1.793044  7.074551  5.513569  6.540343  4.352693  9.915771  828.9727 
 Probability  0.407986  0.029092  0.063496  0.038000  0.113455  0.007028  0.000000 
                
 Sum  262.2700  652.1661  1101.121  1101.740 -10.70000  3586.400  4.000000 
Sum Sq. Dev.  140.0134  50.06201  22.34438  32.83509  2037.684  1225.849  3.789474 
                
Observations  76  76  76  76  76  76  76 
 
Table A3: Test for Serial Correlation 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 1.595887     Prob. F(2,57) 0.2117 
Obs*R-squared 3.870951     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.1444 
     
      
Table A4: Test for Heteroskedasticity 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     F-statistic 0.854982     Prob. F(14,58) 0.6090 
Obs*R-squared 12.48813     Prob. Chi-Square(14) 0.5672 
Scaled explained SS 7.046238     Prob. Chi-Square(14) 0.9329 
     
          
Coefficient Stability Tests  
Table A5: Ramsey Reset Test   
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values  
     
     
 Value Df Probability  
t-statistic  0.402062  58  0.6891  
F-statistic  0.161654 (1, 58)  0.6891  
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Figure A1: Cusum Test 
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Figure A2: Residual Normality Test 
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